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The Determination of Liability in Automobile
Insurance Policies Containing Excess
Insurance Clauses
In recent years automobile liability insurance has become one
of the most important fields of insurance law, which today affects
nearly every person in the country. The great number of accidents
involving motor vehicles continually brings automobile insurance
companies forward to defend lawsuits and to pay judgments arising
therefrom.' With this growth of insurance law and the accompanying
increase in -the number and types of policies held by the owners and
drivers of motor vehicles, insurance companies -have felt obliged to
insert clauses in their policies to divert liability to other insurers
whose policies cover the same wrongful act. A clause frequently
used to divert the loss provides that -the policy shall constitute only
excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance
available to the insured, and is termed an "excess insurance" clause.
"Excess insurance" clauses have been held valid in a vast
majority of jurisdictions, despite arguments that they are against
public policy.2 Usually when the loss is covered by two insurance
policies, and one of ,the policies contains an "excess insurance" clause,
the policy without such a clause constitutes primary insurance. The
insurer whose policy contains the "excess insurance" clause is liable
only -to the extent that the primary insurance does not cover the
loss.3
Common usage of such clauses has given rise -to the problem of
determining liability when two or more policies covering a loss con-
tain "excess insurance" clauses. It must be decided whether one
insurer is the primary carrier, the others constituting excess insurance
over and above the primary insurance, or whether all carriers occupy
the same legal status. Further, if it is found that all carriers occupy
the same legal status, it must then be determined how liability should
be apportioned among them.
I.
Numerous paths have been followed by the courts in their
attempts to determine the liability of each party where there are two
or more "excess -insurance" clauses in litigation. Seemingly the only
1 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 4251 (1942).
American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
3 Continental Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 143 N.E. 2d 169 (Ohio
1957).
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view not taken by the courts is that neither carrier is primarily liable.
While such an interpretation would be necessary if a literal effect
were given to both clauses, the courts and the insurers themselves
agree that to so hold would be completely unwarranted - a loss
could be covered by several insurance policies, but the individual
who thought he was adequately insured would be forced to pay.4
The majority of the courts hold that where there are two or
more "excess insurance" clauses in the policies covering the loss,
and there is no policy without such a clause, these clauses should be
disregarded as being mutually repugnant and the loss should be
prorated among or between the insurers.5 The case law is unanimous
in holding the insurers liable and prorating ,the loss among them when
-the policies contain no "excess insurance" clauses.' The courts
following the majority view have thus extended this 'basic rule of
insurance law by ignoring the "excess insurance" clauses in such
a situation.
Representative of the majority view is Oregon Auto. Ins. Co.
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,7 an action for a declaratory
judgment. The policy of one insurance carrier covered X who was
driving the automobile at the time of the accident, and included his
operation of other vehicles except as to losses covered by other
insurance. The other policy was issued to the owner of the automo-
bile involved and included liability arising from the operation of the
vehicle 'by another with the owner's consent, except as to losses
covered by other insurance. Citing and refusing to accept the numer-
ous 'holdings of other federal and state courts, the court held the
clauses to 'be "indistinguishable in meaning and intent.
"One cannot rationally choose between them. We understand
the parties to concede that where neither policy has an 'other
insurance' provision, the rule is to hold the two insurers liable
to prorate in proportion to the amount of insurance provided
by their respective policies. Here, where 'both policies carry
like 'other insurance' provisions, we think [they] must 'be held
4 Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958
(9th Cir. 1952).
5 ]bid.; Continental Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Mercury F. & M. Ins. Co., 163
F. Supp. 325 (S.D. Fla. 1958); Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Pacific Em-
ployers Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 188, 227 P.2d 53 (1951). See generally,
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960).
6 143 N.E.2d 169.
7 195 F.2d 958.
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mutually repugnant and hence be disregarded. Our conclusion
is that such view affords the only rational solution of the dispute
in this case."'
The problem often rises where one who has insurance covering
him while driving any automobile with the owner's permission, except
as to losses covered by other insurance, rents an automobile from
a car rental concern which 'has a policy covering anyone permissively
driving its vehicles, except as to losses covered by other insurance.
These were essentially the facts in Continental Cas. Co. v. Buckeye
Union Cas. Co.,9 where the court held that both companies afforded
joint coverage and each has the obligation to share the amount of
damages.
"fM we accept as a truism the fact, and it is a fact, that there
can be no 'excess' insurance in the absence of a 'primary' in-
surance, it follows as night follows day that since neither policy
by its terms is a policy of 'primary' insurance, neither policy
can operate as a policy of 'excess' insurance. The policies are
not changed. The 'excess' provisions of the policy merely are
inoperative as being impossible of accomplishment in the way
that such excess provisions are inoperative if there is no other
insurance in effect.' °
The court further states that the situation -which here arises is very
different from the "double insurance" problem arising in property
law, where two policies are held 'by the same person. Here two
policies are owned -by two different people; different insurance com-
panies are involved. Had it not been for policy No. 2, policy No. 1
would have 'been liable for the entire liability. Thus the existence of
a second policy effectuates a saving to the first policy.
While a majority of courts have accepted this seemingly better
view, ethers have set forth a -number of divergent views on this
subject. There is no one minority view; rather courts that do not
follow the position of the majority 'have developed their own peculiar
holdings.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a policy stating
that coverage ". . .shall be an excess cover over and 'above the valid
8 Id. at 960.
9 143 N.E.2d 169.01Id. at 180.
[ Vol. 63
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and collectible insurance.. ." is secondary to a policy stating that if
-the -insured covered by the policy " ... is also covered by other valid
and collectible insurance... "the insured shall not be indemnified un-
der the policy." In so holding, the court apparently means that the use
of the word "excess" is sufficient to make an insurer secondarily
liable-the insurer who chose the word "other" is primarily liable.
While such a rule will temporarily alleviate the problem, it does not
afford a permanent solution. The insurance companies will be more
careful in the drafting of their policies, and be certain to include
the word "excess" therein. Finally the court will be faced with the
problem again when two policies are in conflict, both of which
contain the magic word "excess".
Another minority position is that the policy which is first in
time constitutes primary insurance. Any insurance which is later
in time and also covers the loss is secondary. 2 In rejecting this view
on the ground that liability on both policies actually came into exist-
ence on the happening of the same event, i.e. injury to a third party
resulting from the negligent driving of a motor vehicle by one falling
within the scope of both policies, Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co.
v. Clamor 3 presents still another minority holding. One policy con-
tained an omnibus clause extending coverage to any person using the
insured automobile with the permission of the -named assured. It
was stated that this clause did not apply to any person ". .. with
respect to any loss against which he has other valid and collectible
insurance."' 4 The other policy stated that "the insurance shall be
excess insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance
available to -the insured."'" The accident occurred while the assured
under the second policy was driving the first assured's automobile
with his permission. In holding the first insurer liable to the extent
provided in the policy, and the second insurer liable only for the
excess, the court stated that the more specific language of the second
policy controlled.
This line of reasoning was attacked as arbitrary in Continental
Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co. 6 In stating that the truck
"1 Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 94 F.2d 710, 711 (3d
Cir. 1938) (Emphasis added).I New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 108 F.2d
653 (6th Cir. 1940).
13 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941).
141d. at 718.15 Ibid.
16 143 N.E.2d 169.
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insured was a specific automobile, and the person insured by the
other policy was a specific person, the court inquired:
"Which is more 'specific'? What are the comparative yard-
sticks one would employ in such a determination? We know
of none. In our opinion any attempt to weigh the specifics of
the two on the balance scale of the law would be at best an
arbitrary conclusion not based on any logical premise.' ' 7
This is not to preclude the possibility of policies so different to war-
rant a decision that one clause is more specific than the other. In
such a case, the more specific policy should be considered as the
primary one.'8 However, in most cases involving this problem, the
difference in the "excess -insurance" clauses is simply a difference in
form rather than substance.
The rule expounded by Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bankers Indem.
Ins. Co." seems to be the best of the minority views. There it was
held that the insurer of the person primarily liable for the damage
is the primary carrier. All other insurance policies constitute sec-
ondary or "excess insurance." The logic is simple. If A negligently
drives B's automobile, thereby injuring C, A is primarily liable for
the accident. Thus A's insurer should likewise be primarily liable.
II.
While the problem of multiple "excess insurance" clauses is
becoming more prevalent, the West Virginia Supreme Court has not
yet been called upon to express its view on the subject. However,
the neighboring state of Virginia has set forth an interesting rule
relating to this situation. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co.2" P nd D through the same agent issued insurance policies
to X. X's employee, under an agreement with X, drove his own
automobile, thereby injuring T. T recovered a judgment against X
in an action defended and paid for by P. The court held, that where
one insurer, P, assumed liability on its policy for the loss and paid
a judgment for which the motorist was primarily liable, the insurer
was not entitled to reimbursement from another insurer, D, even
though D's policy was one of general liability -and P's contained an
'
71d. at 179.
'
8 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill &
Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856 (1921).
19 51 Ohio App. 323, 200 N.E. 849 (1935).20 191 Va. 225, 60 S.E.2d 876 (1950).
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"excess insurance" clause. However, since this case was decided on
the "voluntary payment" theory, i.e. one who voluntarily pays a debt
of another is estopped from compelling repayment in the absence of
an -agreement to the contrary, a timely presentation of the issue in
Virginia under different circumstances would probably present an
open question to the court.
A final minority rule was proposed by the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Preferred Acc. Ins.
Co.2' involved a dispute between the insurer of the owner of the
automobile involved and the insurer of the driver -who was held to
be a permissive user of the vehicle. Both policies contained "excess
insurance" clauses. It was held that the insurer of the owner is
primarily liable to discharge any liability established against the
driver of the automobile by reason of an accident within the limits
of the policy; the insurer of the driver is liable only for any excess.
American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co.22 followed this rule in holding
the insurer of the lessor of a motor vehicle primarily liable and the
insurer of the lessee secondarily liable. Such a theory appears to
be unreasonable since the owner was not even in possession of the
vehicle at the time of the accident. The reason for the rule rests
on the idea that the owner should be careful not to entrust his vehicle
with a negligent person.
Although numerous views 'have been expressed 'by the courts in
this area, the 'better view and the one supported by a majority of the
courts is, that where two or more insurance policies covering a loss
contain "excess insurance" clauses, these clauses should 'be dis-
regarded as being mutually repugnant.
III.
If two or more of the insurers are found to occupy the same
legal status, the problem then arises as to 'how the liability should be
apportioned among or between them. The views of the courts in
this area are almost as varied as those determining the legal status
of the insurers.
This problem is best illustrated by posing a hypothetical situa-
tion: assume two insurers 'have been held to afford coverage of a
21 78 F. Supp. 561 (W.D. Va. 1948).22 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
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loss of 5,000 dollars. The policy limits are 10,000 dollars and 90,000
dollars. How much should each insurer be required to pay?
A majority of the cases provide for proration in accord with
the proportionate policy limits applicable. Following this rule, the
10,000 dollar insurer would be liable for one-tenth of the loss. The
90,000 dollar insurer would pay the other nine-tenths. This method
of proratic seems to be the most equitable and is supported by
text writers as well as by the courts.23
However, this basis of proration has been rejected by some
courts. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co. 4 dis-
carded the theory because the cost of liability insurance does not
increase proportionately with the limits of an insurance policy. "The
cost of increased limits is relatively small when compared to the
cost of minimum coverage."25 The court proceeded to hold that
since both companies stood on a relatively equal footing, equity
would require an equal apportionment of the amount of settlement
and expenses. Thus it may be inferred from the language used by
the court that the basis of proration should be that which appears
most equitable in a particular case. For this reason, it is doubtful
that in the hypothetical problem here posed, this court would require
each insurance company -to pay one-half, i.e. 2,500 dollars. Such a
holding -would not be equitable, for although one company's limit is
nine times that of the other, they would be 'held equally liable for
the loss.
Another rule as -to proration is stated in Ins. Co. of Texas v.
Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.26, where it was held that liability
should be prorated according to the premiums paid the insurers by
their policy holders. While such a view may appear to be equitable
on the surface, it is generally known that many variables affect the
payment of premiums, e.g. regular automobile insurance as compared
to fleet coverage.
Various theories of proration have been proposed and accepted
where the insurers are placed on the same legal footing. The best
rule as supported by the majority of the cases and by some text
writers requires proration in accord with the proportionate policy
23 195 F.2d 958; 8 APPLEMAN, INSuRANC E § 4913 (1942). See generally,
Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1960).
2428 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959).251d. at 564, 147 A.2d at 534.
26 163 F. Supp. 143 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
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limits applicable to the loss. However, equity may dictate the use of
another theory if such is required to do justice in a particular case.27
Conclusion
The use of "excess insurance" clauses in automobile liability
insurance policies has grown with the number of such policies issued
in recent years. When two such clauses come into conflit, the courts
are faced with an important problem which has been settled in a
variety of ways. In such a case it has 'been held that the word "excess"
in a policy makes that policy secondary to one using the term "other";
that the policy which is first in time is primary; that the policy which
is seemingly more specific is secondary, the more general one pri-
mary; that the insurance of the driver of the vehicle is primary; that
the insurance of the owner of the vehicle is primary. Out of this
myriad of theories emerges one view that is looked upon with favor
by a majority of courts, and appears to be supported by the best
reasoning. Where two or more "excess insurance" clauses are pres-
ent, they are mutually repugnant and inoperative as being impossible
of accomplishment, and should thus be disregarded.
Once it has been determined that the insurers are on the same
legal footing, the problem of proration of the liability among them
arises. Although the best rule followed by a majority of the cases
suggests proration in accordance with the proportionate policy limits,
equity should determine the rule which is just as applied to the facts
of each case.
Frederick Luther Davis, Ir.
27 One final point should be observed concerning the problem of pro-
ration. Whatever theory is used by a court in a particular case, the proration
should be applied both as to damages and as to the expense of defending the
suit. 195 F.2d 958.
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